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THE LAW OF PEOPLES
WHAT SELF-GOVERNING PEOPLES OWE TO
ONE ANOTHER: UNIVERSALISM, DIVERSITY,
AND THE LAW OF PEOPLES
Stephen Macedo*
[A] people sincerely affirming a nonliberal idea of justice may still
reasonably think its society should be treated equally in a reasonably
just Law of Peoples. Although full equality may be lacking within a
society, equality may be reasonably put forward in making claims
against other societies.'
Do efforts to extend and enforce human rights unfairly impose
Western liberal and individualistic values on societies whose varying
traditions deserve greater respect?
Are supposedly "universal"
human rights "just another cunning exercise 2 in Western moral
imperialism," as Michael Ignatieff pointedly asks?
Liberal academics and intellectuals in the West often argue, with
Martha Nussbaum, that "there are no obstacles to justifying the same
norms, in the area of basic entitlements, for all the world's people."3
According to liberal cosmopolitans, we can think of individuals
around the globe as having the same basic interests in freedom and
equality that we ascribe to persons within Western societies when we
* This Essay was written while I was a visiting professor in the Center for Ethics and
the Professions at Harvard University: my thanks to Center Director Dennis F.
Thompson and to the other fellows, especially Alon Harel who commented on the
first draft. I am also grateful to conference participants at "Theoretical Foundations
of Human Rights," at Mofid University, Qom, Iran, May 2003; the Program in Law
and Public Affairs, Princeton University, Human Rights Conference, November 2003;
and the Fordham Law School Conference that was the basis for this symposium. The
argument of this Essay is deeply indebted to several excellent prior treatments of
these topics: J. Donald Moon, Rawls's Law of Peoples: A Revisionist Account?
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Michael I. Blake, DistributiveJustice,
State Coercion, and Autonomy, 30 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 257 (2001); Leif Wenar, The
Legitimacy of Peoples, in Global Justice and Transnational Politics: Essays on the
Moral and Political Challenges of Globalization (Pablo De Greiff & Ciaran Cronin
eds., 2002); T.M. Scanlon, Human Rights as Neutral Concern, in T.M. Scanlon, The
Difficulty of Tolerance:
Essays in Moral Philosophy (2003); as well as to
conversations with Arthur Applbaum, Michael Blake, Mattias Risse, and others.
1. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 70 (1999).
2. Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry 58 (2001).
3. Martha Nussbaum, Women and the Law of Peoples, 1 Pol. Phil. & Econ. 283,
286 (2002).
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think about fundamental principles of justice. John Rawls, arguably
the greatest political philosopher of the twentieth century and the
most important academic exponent of liberalism since John Stuart
Mill, has rejected this liberal cosmopolitan view.' Rawls conceives of
the subjects of international justice not as individual persons but as
independent "peoples." Liberal societies should be tolerant and fully
respectful of decent and well-ordered societies that reject some liberal
principles of justice familiar in the United States, such as complete
civil and political equality for women and the separation of church
and state. Rawls's prime example of a non-liberal but decent and fully
respectable society is a hypothetical Islamic society that he calls
"Kazanistan." Progressive liberals in the West have criticized this
qualified embrace of diversity. Allen Buchanan charges that Rawls,
by focusing on peoples rather than individuals, "gives short shrift to
dissenting individuals and minorities."5
What, if anything, justifies Rawls's reluctance in The Law of
Peoples to extend his principles of liberal justice to all the world's
persons? Is it because when we move to the relations among states or
peoples we encounter forms of cultural and religious pluralism that
are wider and deeper than we encounter at home? The greater
diversity that we encounter on the world stage might well seem to
necessitate that we settle for an "overlapping consensus" on shared
political principles that are thinner and less substantial than we are
able to generate at home.
The formula seems simple and
straightforward:
As we move from domestic justice to the
international case, we encounter greater diversity, and that means that
some domestic principles of justice must be jettisoned to
accommodate societies that are less individualistic and more
"communitarian" than those of the West, societies that may deny full
equality of rights to women, religious minorities, and others.6 The
problem of greater diversity would seem to neatly explain why shared
principles of international justice will be thinner and less substantial
than principles of domestic justice.
The problem with the diversity-based case for distinguishing justice
within political societies and justice across political societies is that it is
4. With respect to justice in pluralistic modern Western societies, Rawls has
argued for two principles of justice:
(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme
of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of
liberties for all; and (b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two
conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be
to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the
difference principle).
John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 42-43 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
5. Allen Buchanan, Rawls's Law of Peoples, 110 Ethics 691, 698 (2000).
6. See Daniel A. Bell, East Meets West: Human Rights and Democracy in East
Asia (2000).
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non-moral. According to this explanation, the substance of justice is
held hostage to the brute facts of global diversity. Some will say that
it is altogether consistent with the diminished moral ambitions of
Rawls's "political liberalism," founded as it is on the insistence that
political theory must accommodate itself to the permanent fact of
deep religious and philosophical pluralism.7 This seems to me to be
an error, though not one that I can pursue here.8
In this Essay I offer a moral defense for Rawls's conditional
accommodation of diversity among peoples: a defense that rests not
on the fact of global diversity but on the moral significance of
collective self-governance. Collective self-governance yields a moral
basis for respecting global diversity and also moral standards or
criteria for discerning which peoples merit our respect. The criteria of
respect are in fact quite demanding, though not equivalent to liberal
justice. Liberal cosmopolitans like Nussbaum have raised important
concerns, but have not sufficiently acknowledged that in order to
qualify for full respect a people or state must do more than "obey
certain minimal human rights norms."9 Decent and well-ordered
peoples qualify for full respect when they are genuinely collectively
self-governing. Their governing structures must provide inclusion and
voice for dissenters, minorities, and the most disadvantaged, and those
who wield power must be genuinely responsive to these voices. The
laws of such a community are understood by its members to impose
genuine moral obligations on its members; non-liberal but decent and
well-ordered societies are moral communities. Political systems that
rest on overt or veiled forms of tyranny and oppression do not qualify
for this respect. Rawls's argument thus reflects the moral significance
of membership in well-ordered, self-governing and self-responsible
political communities.
I. THE PUZZLING LAW OF PEOPLES

Scholars such as Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge applied the ideas
of John Rawls's A Theory of Justice to the international arena by
reworking the thought experiment of the original position, and
broadening it to include the people of the world.' ° This approach in
effect generalized and extended the individualistic and egalitarian
premises of liberal justice worked out in the domestic context-based

7. See, e.g., Michael J. Sandel, PoliticalLiberalism, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1765 (1994)
(book review).
8. See generally John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1996). The argument of
political liberalism seems to me a fully moral argument, as I have argued in Stephen
Macedo, Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy
(2000).
9. Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 283.
10. See Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (1999);
Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (2002).
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on the interests of individual persons understood as free and equalto offer "liberal cosmopolitan" accounts of international justice which
generalize the sorts of individual rights claims and entitlements
justified within societies such as the United States.
The Law of Peoples rejects liberal cosmopolitanism: the relevant
subjects of international justice are "peoples," not individuals."
Rawls stresses the sorts of concerns that animate PoliticalLiberalism:
We encounter in the world a variety of forms of diversity far broader
than we encounter at home. In formulating their foreign policies,
liberal peoples should not simply extend and apply their domestic
liberal convictions to other societies. They should seek fair terms of
cooperation that are reciprocally acceptable and fair to liberal and to
non-liberal but decent peoples.
Decent but non-liberal societies may deny full equality to women or
to members of religious minorities by, for example, excluding them
from higher political offices. Decent peoples are satisfied, nonaggressive, and prepared to cooperate and live in peace with one
another. Rawls considers one category of decent non-liberal peoples,
namely, decent hierarchical peoples.
Behind a hypothetical "veil of ignorance," representatives of these
decent (liberal and non-liberal) peoples should be assumed not to
know the size of their territory, its strength, or its relative level of
development. Peoples strive to protect their political independence
and their culture, as well as the proper respect due them as
independent peoples. 2 Rawls asserts that decent peoples (liberal and
non-liberal) would agree to at least eight principles that reflect a
baseline of equality among peoples:
(1) Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and
independence are to be respected by other peoples. (2) Peoples are
to observe treaties and undertakings. (3) Peoples are equal and
parties to the agreements that bind them. (4) Peoples are to observe
a duty of non-intervention. (5) Peoples have the right of selfdefense but no right to instigate war for reasons other than selfdefense. (6) Peoples are to honor human rights. (7) Peoples are to
observe certain specified restrictions in their conduct of war. (8)
Peoples have a duty to assist other people living under unfavorable
conditions that
13 prevent their having a just or decent political and
social regime.
11. "Peoples" is meant to avoid some of the connotations of "nation" and "state."
The groups that compose self-governing peoples are often of diverse ethnic and
national backgrounds. Peoples do not simply seek rationally to maximize their
interests or power. Unlike "states" in much international relations theory, they can be
collectively motivated by moral principles. "Peoples" are characterized internally by
common sympathies and governments responsive to their members. Rawls, The Law
of Peoples, supra note 1, at 23-27.
12. Id. at 34-35.
13. Id. at 37. I have quoted these eight principles. Rawls allows that these
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Rawls, like Michael Ignatieff, affirms that "human rights proper"that peoples must respect as a condition of their right to nonintervention-are the subset of the most urgent rights contained in the
Universal Declaration, including means to "subsistence and
security.., sufficient measure of liberty of conscience to ensure
freedom of religion and thought," personal property, and equality
before the law.'4 In addition, Rawls asserts that decent peoples would
formulate guidelines for cooperative organizations, including fair
standards for trade, a cooperative banking system, and a
confederation such as the United Nations. Rawls argues that these
principles should be affirmed by decent liberal and non-liberal
peoples as a stable basis for international cooperation.
Liberal and non-liberal decent peoples are both referred to as
"well-ordered" because they endorse the principles stated above, and
because they give their members a meaningful role in making political
decisions. The Law of Peoples "does not require decent societies to
abandon or modify their religious institutions and adopt liberal
ones."'" Rawls goes so far as to insist that liberal peoples should
refrain from non-coercive sanctions or even official criticisms with
respect to these societies:
[I]t is not reasonable for a liberal people to adopt as part of its own
foreign policy the granting of subsidies to other peoples as incentives
to become more liberal ....[S]elf-determination, duly constrained
by appropriate conditions, is an important good for a people ....
Decent societies16 should have the opportunity to decide their future
for themselves.
It should be noted, finally, that there are various additional types of
societies with respect to whom liberal societies do not seek fair terms
of cooperation. These include aggressive outlaw states, which violate
human rights, societies burdened by unfavorable conditions, and
benevolent absolutisms, that honor human rights and are nonaggressive but which also deny members a "meaningful role in making
political decisions,"' 7 and so who are considered not "well-ordered." 18
None of these societies are considered well-ordered and none are
party to the Law of Peoples.

II. WHAT Do PEOPLES OWE EACH OTHER?
Peoples owe a "duty of assistance" to "burdened societies":
impoverished societies that lack the political culture or human capital
principles are subject to multiple and competing interpretations. Id. at 42-43.
14. Id. at 65; see also Ignatieff, supra note 2. Unlike Ignatieff, Rawls includes
positive and not only negative rights.
15. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 1, at 63, 121.
16. Id. at 85.
17. Id. at 4.
18. Id.
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or the resources to be well-ordered or decent. Fulfilling this duty
would require countries like the United States to substantially
increase their foreign aid. Once a society attains a level where it is
capable of running its own affairs and governing itself in light of its
shared ideals and providing a decent common life for its people, this
duty of assistance is fulfilled and no further transfers of aid are
required. Unlike justice in the domestic case, there is no principle of
distributive justice among decent peoples. 9
The duty of assistance is qualified by the fact that when societies are
desperately poor, it is not primarily because they lack a fair share of
the world's natural resources, but because of disorders rooted in
political culture and institutions. z
Countries with few natural
resources (such as Japan) may prosper, and countries rich in natural
resources (such as Argentina) may remain poor. According to Rawls,
national prosperity depends on good government. "I would further
conjecture," he says, "that there is no society anywhere in the world"
excepting certain marginal cases such as the "Arctic Eskimos" "with
resources so scarce, that it could not, were it reasonably and rationally
organized and governed, become well-ordered.""1
There can be little doubt that some countries remain poor on
account of oppressive political institutions or the rule of a corrupt
"kleptocracy." It may not be easy to help a burdened society reform
its institutions and culture, aspects of which may be deeply embedded.
Giving money to poor but corrupt and oppressive regimes may do
more harm than good.
Nevertheless, I would be reluctant to give too much weight to these
particular empirical generalizations. The persistence of poverty in
substantial regions of the world may be due not to corrupt or
ineffective institutions (as Rawls argues), nor to colonial exploitation
(as others argue), but rather to geographical factors. Dire and
persistent poverty in sub-Saharan Africa and the Andean region of
South America-the two most extensive global "poverty traps"-is
explained, according to Jeffrey Sachs, by geographical factors that
include the distance of the population from navigable waterways
(inhibiting the development of markets), and the prevalence of
diseases with especially high morbidity rates (which inhibit the growth
of human capital). 2 Sachs suggests, in effect, that Rawls is right not to
19. Id. at 106. For the principles of justice that apply domestically, see supra note
4.
20. Rawls says in a typical remark that "[b]urdened societies ...lack the political
and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, and, often, the material and
technological resources needed to be well-ordered." Rawls, Law of Peoples, supra
note 1, at 106. Of course, tyrannical rule, colonialism, and oppression often also play
a substantial role.
21. Id. at 108.
22. Jeffrey Sachs, Institutions Don't Rule: Direct Effects of Geography on Per
Capita Income (January 2003) (NBER Working Paper 9490), available at
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attribute much of the most persistent global poverty to exploitation,
but wrong to attribute it to bad culture and faulty institutions: The
poorest regions of the world are victims of unfortunate geographical
circumstances. According to Sachs's hopeful account, international
aid (directed at developing transportation infrastructures and treating
diseases), and reduced trade barriers in the developed world
(especially the United States) could help make these regions
participants in global market institutions.
It is also important to keep in mind that Rawls is addressing "ideal
theory": the proper relations among decent liberal and non-liberal
peoples, understood for these purposes without regard to particular
relations of past or present exploitation. He does not address the
additional obligations that arise from particular relations of colonial
exploitation, interference in the political affairs of other societies, the
use of military or economic power to extract unfair advantages in
international trade, unfair advantages in international trade, or trade
and economic policies that allow rich countries and their corporations
to exploit their advantages by making unfair rules of trade.23 The Law
of Peoples cannot be considered a complete account of what actual
countries owe to one another; it is at most a baseline account of what
peoples owe to one another abstracted away from particular histories
of exploitation, domination, and unfairness, which often call out for
specific forms of rectification and reform.
Why is there no analog of the domestic principle of justice that calls
for the "basic structure" of international affairs to be arranged such
that inequalities are to the advantage of the least well-off and the less
well-off are compensated for the arbitrariness of fortune? Persons are
morally equal, and whether I am born a member of one society or
another seems morally arbitrary, just as arbitrary as the position into
which I am born within my society, a point that is so crucial to
Rawlsian domestic justice. So why shouldn't international justice
make direct comparisons of the relative well-being of individuals
within different societies?
The domestic and international cases are, in fact, quite different.
Partly this difference is because of the diversity of cultures and values,
as Rawls emphasizes, but I believe the fundamental point is respect
for self-governing peoples understood as independent (though
cooperating) and responsible.
Within a society such as the United States, we can properly posit
that citizens in general want more of certain primary goods, which
include income and wealth, and we can use the relative standing of
http://www.earth.columbia.edu/about/director/publicat.html
(along with related
papers).
23. On the importance of trade barriers, see Pogge, supra note 10; see also Rawls,
Law of Peoples, supra note 1, at 42-43.
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different social positions in terms of the opportunity to acquire wealth
and income (and other primary goods) to assess which social positions
are worse-off and which are better-off. There is, however, no reason
to assume that societies or peoples in general desire ever greater
amounts of aggregate wealth.24 A decent and well-ordered peopleone capable of providing a decent life for all members and of living up
to its own ideals of justice-may decide that it has accumulated
enough, or it may give a low priority to saving and investing for the
sake of growing its capital stock and national wealth in favor of other
priorities such as subsidizing culture or learning. Rawls emphasizes
that duties of assistance across peoples should be targeted to permit
every society to become a well-ordered and decent member of the
international society of free and equal peoples, capable of setting its
own collective priorities and making policy choices in light of these.
The United States and France, for example, make different
collective choices reflecting different priorities with respect to work,
leisure, and provision of social services, and different levels of
economic growth may be a consequence. France may be worse-off in
term of income and wealth, but not in terms of the variety of public
and private goods as a whole. We cannot compare societies in terms
of wealth and income and say that one is "better-off" all things
considered.
One might concede much of the foregoing but still argue that
nations' overall well-being is affected not only by values and choices
but also by morally arbitrary luck and fortune. We have collective
obligations to compensate for ill-fortune in the name of greater
fairness and based on the fundamental moral equality of all persons.
Consider for example the enormous benefit that is being conferred
on English speakers because English is becoming the international
lingua franca. Though non-English speakers presumably benefit from
the emergence of an international lingua franca, they bear and will
bear substantial costs relative to English speakers for, as it were, the
joint production of this common good.
Here is an arbitrary
distribution of benefits and burdens arising directly from the fact of
international cooperation. Philipp Van Parijs argues that English
speakers owe remuneration to compensate non-English speakers for
the costs that they bear.
Moreover, the well-being of everyone is increasingly dependent on
an international "basic structure" of trade relations and regulations,
global movements of goods, money, people, and ideas, as well as a
regime of international law, and environmental regulation.
Globalization, on this argument, is collapsing the difference between
24. Rawls stresses that such an assumption characterizes the business classes of
commercial societies, but is by no means axiomatic for peoples in general. Rawls, The
Law of Peoples, supra, note 1, at 107 n.33.
25. See Philipp Van Parijs, LinguisticJustice, 1 Pol. Phil. & Econ. 59 (2002).
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domestic and international society. Insofar as Rawls confines the
demands of distributive justice to domestic society, isn't he, as Allen
Buchanan has charged, offering rules for a vanished "Westphalian
world"? 26 Surely this argues for the superiority of a cosmopolitan
view of global distributive justice that focuses on what wealthy
countries owe to the poorer (and not just the destitute) people of the
world.
In fact, however, cosmopolitan justice runs counter to a great deal
of common sense and practice.
III. SELF-GOVERNING AND SELF-RESPONSIBLE PEOPLES

While international cooperation is quite important and while we
properly seek to enhance it, the most extensive powers of collective
self-governance are concentrated at the level of independent (but
cooperating) peoples. Collective self-government depends on a
division of the world into self-governing units, and few seek to change
this fundamental fact. Self-governing peoples may or may not share a
common language and they are extremely likely to be ethnically,
racially, and religiously diverse. Their geographical borders are likely
the result of historical accident. Nevertheless, borders acquire moral
significance on account of the fact that they form limits to selfgovernance: Americans take responsibility for what happens in North
Dakota and Mississippi in a way they do not for what happens in
Chihuahua and Ontario.
Citizens look to one another to jointly establish collective programs
concerning health and welfare: they view themselves as jointly
responsible for their unlimited future. Impoverished countries look to
outsiders for help, but what they typically want is help to get on their
own feet so they can establish their own collective self-rule.
Federations of states such as Europe may voluntarily enter into
increasing cooperative relations, but we understand European peoples
to be doing this as a matter of joint convenience and choice, not as an
obligation of justice.
Cosmopolitan liberals underrate the moral significance of political
communities. Martha Nussbaum, for example, charges that "Rawls's
argument permits certain groups to have great power over the lives of
individuals, wherever those groups have geographical concentration27
and power such that they are able to form an independent state.
These "'peoples'... have a mysterious sort of unity, different from the
bonds that hold together members of religions and other groups that
26. See Buchanan, supra note 5. Charles R. Beitz has also emphasized and
elaborated this point to "illustrate the instability of a theory resting on a sharp
distinction between the domestic and the international realm." Charles R. Beitz,
Rawls's Law of Peoples, 110 Ethics 669, 694 (2000).
27. Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 295.
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exist within nations.... Rawls has given no reason why the same
group should be treated differently when it manages to form a
state .... 2
The moral significance of peoples is not really so mysterious, but let
us remind ourselves what a people does in assuming the powers of
self-government. They form a union usually understood as perpetual,
and assert permanent control over a given territory, perhaps as the
result of a violent struggle for independence.
They adopt a
constitution and declare a set of fundamental values. They establish
political institutions empowered to make binding law and to protect
basic rights. They make rules of property, family life, and association,
create systems of taxation and criminal punishment, and institute
projects to advance the collective welfare, all subject to ongoing
collective deliberation and revision.
They constitute executive
agencies to maintain domestic order, to enforce the law, and to
protect the people's interests abroad, by the use of deadly force if
necessary. For the sake of the common defense, young adults may be
drafted to fight and possibly to die. They consider civil war to be the
ultimate calamity.
Within this created political framework
individuals, families, and associations of all sorts define and pursue
their purposes and projects. Citizens have powerful obligations of
mutual concern and respect to one another because the political
institutions for which they are responsible determine patterns of
opportunities and rewards for all.29
All of this could not simultaneously be true of the international
society, and it is not. Being a member of a political community is a
great good. We consider it a great misfortune to be "stateless."
Membership in international bodies has nothing like the same
significance: that membership is mediated by membership in primary
political units, namely the "Member States" of the U.N. or its
Peoples.30
Citizens of countries that are capable of decently conducting their
own affairs do not want to be deprived of their political independence.
28. Id. at 294.
29. For a nice related account, see Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The
Theory and Practice of Equality 1-2 (2000).
30. The U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are
instruments created by "the peoples of the United Nations" or "Member States."
U.N. Charter pmbl.; United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), available at
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. Contrast the phrasing "We the peoples of
the United Nations" and "We the people of the United States," which open the
preambles to the U.N. Charter and the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const.
pmbl. The U.N. Charter closes, "IN FAITH WHEREOF the representatives of the
Governments of the United Nations have signed the present Charter." These matters
cannot, of course, be resolved by these textual or historical facts alone. Provinces and
states within nations, autonomous territories, and plural or consociational regimes
raise additional issues not covered here.
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It is, moreover, hard to understand the reasonableness of making
people responsible for the welfare of others without also making them
responsible for their governance.
It would be strange and
unreasonable to sever responsibilities for the provision of health and
welfare from responsibilities for governance.
We have strong
common obligations as fellow citizens because we collectively assert
control over each other. A self-governing political society is a hugely
significant joint venture, and we understand it as such. Cosmopolitan
distributive justice (as opposed to a duty to assist other peoples to
become self-governing) makes no sense absent a cosmopolitan state
and a cosmopolitan political community, for which hardly anyone
seriously argues (and which Rawls, following Kant, rightly rejects).
What is morally basic, therefore, is not simply that societies place
different values on goods, such as wealth, leisure, or learning, but that
we make different collective choices about how to produce various
goods, how to implement policies, how to administer programs, and
how to organize and manage social relations.
But, returning to a point made above, granting that societies make
different political choices, are not all also subject to brute luck and
fortune? Shouldn't we compensate for arbitrary fortune across
societies as we do within societies? But here again, the pooling of risk
does not make much sense aside from institutions of mutual
governance and regulation. We can plan for bad luck and ill fortune.
Earthquakes may be a matter of luck, but building codes are not. It is
likewise true that the vagaries of international trade often produce
winners and losers by luck and accident, not desert, both at home and
internationally. But we collectively debate and decide on economic
policies in light of what can be known about such contingencies:
deciding whether to focus or diversify the economy.
Persons' relations with global institutions are largely mediated
through their political collectivities, and it does not appear that this
will change any time soon. Of course there should be limits. I support
the International Criminal Court and even the universal jurisdiction of
national courts over heinous international crimes. International
cooperative relations and trade relations are themselves regulated by
states or by agencies created by states. There is a tendency to
exaggerate the declining relevance of states.
International
organizations and regulatory regimes are important tools of
cooperation among peoples, and peoples may decide to participate in
collective insurance schemes, but international institutions have never
assumed anything like the range of responsibilities and authority of
well-ordered domestic political societies.
There seem good reasons for confining the extensive obligation of
distributive justice to self-governing and self-responsible political
communities: peoples who share a common political life and who
exercise extensive authority over one another. The fundamental fact
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is not the diversity of cultures and values but the respect that is owed
to self-governing and self-responsible decent and well-ordered
peoples.
Of course, again, this is all a matter of ideal theory and considers
only the most general duties of peoples taken in the abstract. If
particular nations have engaged in unfair trade practices, if they have
prospered through colonial domination, if they have used their
military or political power to gain unfair advantages for their own
business interests at the expense of others, if they engage in unfair
trade practices or refuse to support reasonable common arrangements
to control harmful pollution or otherwise to safeguard the planet, then
they may well accumulate additional debts and obligations of
compensation and redress.
IV. FULL RESPECT FOR DECENT NON-LIBERAL PEOPLES?

Perhaps the most surprising aspect of Rawls's argument is, as I have
mentioned, the insistence that liberal peoples should fully respect the
equal standing of non-liberal but decent and well-ordered peoples.
These societies may be ones that deny full equality to women or to
members of religious minorities by, for example, excluding them from
the higher political offices. Liberal peoples should, Rawls insists,
refrain from military or coercive intervention and also from noncoercive sanctions or even official criticisms with respect to these
societies.
If we are convinced of certain principles of basic justice and apply
them to limit our own institutions of self-government, why should we
not affirm these same values in our official relations with other states?
The great puzzle of Rawls's Law of Peoples is this insistence that
liberal peoples should fully respect non-liberal but decent peoples, not
on grounds of prudence, and not simply to restrain interventionist
impulses, but on grounds of basic principle. 3
The position Rawls defends has a familiar ring. Lee Kuan Yew
argues for a distinctive set of Asian values: Asian societies give more
weight to communal and familial obligations than do the
individualistic societies of the West, and they give a higher priority to
economic and social rights than to freedom of expression.3 2 It is
unreasonable to expect East Asian societies like Singapore to adhere
to the same set of fundamental rights as Western societies like the
United States.33
The obvious problem with such arguments is that it is all too
31. See Blake, DistributiveJustice, supra note *.
32. See text accompanying infra note 51.
33. Rawls explicitly includes communitarian convictions similar to these as among
the features of decent non-liberal societies that ought to be respected. Rawls, The
Law of Peoples, supra note 1, at 73.
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convenient for authoritarians like Lee to claim to speak for the culture
of his people. As Jack Donnelly puts it, "if the differences between
East and West are truly as claimed, Asians can be trusted to exercise
internationally recognized human rights in responsible ways that
make the proper allowances for their cultural values. Asian autocrats,
it seems, think much less of the inclinations and capabilities of their
people. "3
The question is whether we can reconcile two convictions: First,
that respect for the diversity of cultures and traditions means that we
cannot simply universalize the liberal conception of justice worked out
within Western societies. Second, that we must not bow to cultural
diversity as a way of rationalizing the oppression of some by others.
The crucial question is: What are the criteria for meriting full
respect as a decent and well-ordered people? Rawls advances criteria
that respond directly to the worry that cultural pluralism can be used
to rationalize tyranny and oppression. Decent and well-ordered
societies are not fully just by liberal rights but they meet extensive
criteria of inclusion, voice, and responsiveness that insure, in effect,
that if these societies go wrong, the mistake is "theirs to make."35
A decent non-liberal society may be based on some official religious
or other doctrine that shapes its government structure and social
policy: it may have a ruling hierarchy rather than principles of
political equality, or there may be religious restrictions on who may
hold the higher governmental offices. The society must be nonaggressive and respectful of the independence of other societies.36
These decent hierarchical peoples respect human rights proper, which
include the right to life, understood to include the "means of
subsistence and security," to liberty, which includes freedom from
"slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, to a sufficient measure of
liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of religion and thought," the
right to personal property, and to formal equality before the law.37
The established religion may enjoy a variety of privileges, but no
religion is persecuted and all religions can be practiced "in peace and
without fear."38 Because of the privileges enjoyed by the favored

religion, the society must allow and even provide assistance for a right
of emigration.39
These decent hierarchical societies may be "associationist" in form,
says Rawls, the members are viewed in public life first as members of
34.
2003).
35.
36.
37.
special
38.
39.

Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice 119 (2d ed.
As Arthur Applbaum put it to me.
Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 1, at 64, 74.
Id. at 65. Human rights proper "cannot be rejected as peculiarly liberal or
to the Western tradition." Id.
Id. at 74.
Id.
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different groups, not as individuals. 4' But to qualify as well-ordered,
such societies must provide for the political representation of all
groups via a "decent consultation hierarchy." Political power is
exercised only after real consultation with members of society, who
have a substantial political role.
The "common good idea of
justice... takes into account what it sees as the fundamental interests
of everyone in society."41 The rulers "do not allow themselves to be
corrupted, either42by favoring the rich or by enjoying the exercise of
power for itself.
A decent political society is transparent:
society's members
understand the authoritative conception of the common good. The
judges and other public officials of this society administer the laws
conscientiously; the official ideology is not a sham or a ruse. The
consultation procedure genuinely matters to political decisions: it
constrains the pursuit of the society's ideal end. If a group such as
women have long been oppressed, special measures must be taken to
insure that their interests are truly articulated: For example, a
majority of the body that represents them should be "chosen from
among those whose rights have been violated. 43
A decent society respects the rights of dissent. Public officials must
respond to dissent and their responses must address the merits. A
spirit of conscientious reciprocal reason giving and reason demanding
permeates the political order of a decent society, and this precludes
public officials from taking a patronizing or paternalistic attitude
toward societies' dissenting members: "Judges and other officials ...
cannot refuse to listen, charging that the dissenters are incompetent
and unable to understand," indeed, "dissenters are not required to
accept the answer given to them; they may renew their protests,
provided they explain why they are still dissatisfied, and their
explanation in turn ought to receive a further and fuller reply."' The
society is governed not on the basis of naked power or fear but rather
on the open and critical exchange of public reasons.
As a
consequence, decent hierarchical societies have systems of laws that
impose "bona fide moral duties and obligations.., on all persons"
within the territory.4 5
Rawls says we might think of this non-liberal but decent society as
an "idealized Islamic people" which he calls "Kazanistan." To all that
has been said already, Rawls adds that we can imagine that nonMuslims have lived in the territory for generations, and "have been
loyal subjects of society, and then are not subjected to arbitrary
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

64, 68.
67.
75.
64-66, 71.
72.
65-66.
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discrimination, or treated as inferior by Muslims in public or social
relations."
Non-Muslims may be excluded from some higher
government offices but they may serve in the armed forces and the
"higher ranks of command;" they freely respect the "special
priorities" of their government's religious conception and they are
prepared freely to defend their society in times of danger. A decent
society is based on mutual public reasonableness and fair cooperation.
As a consequence, laws impose "duties and obligations on all
members of society."4 6
Decent hierarchical societies are capable of self-reform, and indeed
Rawls insists that their capacity for reform may be enhanced if we
respect them as equal members of the international society of peoples.
Such societies enjoy the good of popular attachment to their own
political society and culture. Liberal societies should encourage them.
If liberalism is superior to their hierarchical conception of the good,
we can expect decent societies to recognize this for themselves. 47 By
respecting societies like the idealized Islamic society of Kazanistan,
we respect the right of self-determination of peoples who meet high
standards of reciprocity and mutual reasonableness: "Decent societies
should have the opportunity to decide their future for themselves. 48
CONCLUSION

Rawls defends two sorts of limits to universalism in The Law of
Peoples, and I have tried to suggest why. He argues that principles of
distributive justice that apply within a society do not apply across
societies:
Wealthier societies fulfill their obligations to poorer
societies insofar as they help them become decently self-governing. In
addition, he argues that a liberal society should adopt a foreign policy
of full respect for societies that are decent and well-ordered (if not
fully liberal), when these criteria are understood to require a political
order that is inclusive and responsive to the good of all groups. There
are both principled and prudential reasons for these constraints.
The crucial principled consideration is that we ought to respect the
right to collective self-rule, so long as the people-all of them-are
collectivity ruling over themselves. There are other conditions as well,
including respect for human rights proper. Political societies do not
qualify as decent and worthy of full respect, on this understanding, if
particular groups are not allowed to express and represent their
interests in the political process. The system of binding law must take
seriously the expressed reasonable interests of all. Rawls insists in
effect that a system of mutual and inclusive self-governance can be
consistent with the maintenance of a religious establishment, so long
46. Id. at 78.
47. Id. at 61-62.
48. Id. at 85.
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as the establishment is tolerant and responsive in the ways I have
indicated. To respect such political societies is to respect distinctive
forms of collective self-rule.
There are also prudential reasons for restraining our interventions
in other societies. Even humanitarian interventions in the affairs of
distant and poorly understood peoples is fraught with danger. Wellintended efforts have often gone horribly awry on account of
ignorance of local cultures and institutions.49 So there are both
principled and prudential grounds to respect local processes for
negotiating change locally on the basis of local understandings and
interpretations of shared values.
We may properly worry about the full legitimacy of locally
negotiated change when particular groups such as women are situated
unequally vis-A-vis men. While Rawls offers only sketchy examples of
genuine and respectable "consultation hierarchies," the spirit of his
discussion is clear enough: Representative institutions must allow
groups of women to express their own interests, and those in power
must listen and take what they hear seriously. The details of how this
process is worked out are, of course, important. Nevertheless, in fact,
women who are disadvantaged within traditional but modernizing
cultures often seem to want to negotiate the tensions between
received cultural norms and their unequal status in ways that allow for
gradualism and compromise. They may not wish simply to renounce
their traditions; they may prize both their continued membership and
the goal of increased empowerment. Given adequate opportunities to
speak and be taken seriously, women in traditionalistic societies may
not be eager for outside intervention."
We should also keep in mind the relative historical positions of
those states that may be disposed to press for full adherence to liberal
rights, and those that resist this in the name of their own distinctive
values and traditions. Resentment of "Westernization" is keenly felt
among some people in less developed societies, especially those who
have been subject to colonial rule and exploitation. When these
societies are on the path toward becoming decent, respectful
cooperation may be the best strategy for encouraging further change.
Virtually all societies do seem to be moving in the direction of
49. Efforts by UNICEF and others to help people in Bangladesh obtain well
water have resulted in massive arsenic poisoning that could result in the death of
millions. See Daniel A. Bell & Joseph Carens, The Ethical Dilemmas of International
Human Rights and Humanitarian NGO's: Reflections on a Dialogue Between
Practitionersand Theorists (unpublished paper, on file with author).
50. See Susan Okin's paper, Multiculturalism and Feminism: No Simple Question,
No Simple Answers (unpublished paper, on file with author), especially the
penultimate section discussing Monique Deveaux's deliberative approach, and her
discussion of tensions between tribal traditions and women's equality in South Africa.
See Monique Deveaux, A Deliberative Approach to Conflicts of Culture, 31 Pol.
Theory 780 (2003).
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constitutionalism, representative institutions, and markets.
So
encouragement and "leading by example" are not to be scorned.
Even Lee Kuan Yew has argued:
The system of government in China will change. It will change in
Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam. It is changing in Singapore. But it will not
end up like the American or British or French or German systems.
What are we seeking? A form of government that will be
comfortable, because it meets our needs, is not oppressive, and
maximizes our opportunities. And whether you have one-man, onevote or some-men, one vote or other men, two votes, those are
forms which should be worked out. I'm not intellectually convinced
that one-man, one-vote is the best.... [W]e would have a better
system if we gave every man over the age of 40 who has a family two
votes because he's likely to be more careful, voting also for his
children.51
If Lee Kuan Yew's rejection of "one person one vote" offends
American liberals, it is worth recalling that John Stuart Mill also
advocated giving extra votes to the well-educated. We should also
keep in mind that different peoples who are quite close exhibit
important constitutional variations on matters pertaining to basic
justice. The United Kingdom has a monarch, an aristocracy, and an
established religion. Protections for civil liberties vary considerably
across Western societies: Britain has a blasphemy law and Canada
has laws against group libel. The German constitution bans anticonstitutional political parties that are constitutionally protected in
the United States. Most Western societies have long permitted public
subsidies for religious schools that have until recently been considered
unconstitutional in the United States. Europeans are appalled that
the United States has capital punishment and no national right to
basic health insurance.
Peoples who are quite close may nevertheless differ with respect to
fundamental constitutional commitments. And the same country may
change fairly quickly and drastically with respect to its understanding
of, or adherence to, basic principles of justice. In the latter half of the
twentieth century the United States experienced a veritable
revolution with respect to race and gender relations, family life, and
sexuality. Over the last twenty years its economic policies have
moved away from principles of liberal distributive justice. These are
not trivial variations.
Given the recent history of political reform in the West, it is not
surprising that many Western readers of The Law of Peoples have
found unacceptable its willingness to respect some non-liberal
regimes, in particular those that do not extend full equality to women.

51. Fareed Zakaria, Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew, 73
Foreign Aff. 109, 119 (1994).
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On the other hand, non-liberal political societies must satisfy stringent
criteria of inclusion, voice, and responsiveness in order to qualify as
decent and well-ordered. When political regimes comply with these
conditions, it is far from obvious that women and other dissenters
would welcome outside interference. Due respect for the project of
collective self-governance requires that just societies resist the impulse
simply to universalize principles arrived at within the horizons of one
people's institutions, history, and culture.

